decision on public-endpoint
The service goes public at api.priorledger.dev through an outbound tunnel to an edge network, with an allow-list behind it: the MCP endpoint, the read API, proposal submission and status, and two discovery files. Everything else, including the steward portal, is refused at the allow-list, and the service refuses the portal on the public name a second time, so stewarding stays on a private network. The allow-list listens on the machine itself only; no inbound port is opened and the machine's address appears in no DNS record. It drops requests for any other host name, keeps no access log, and takes the client address only from the tunnel, overwriting any the client sends. Proposals are rate-limited per address at both layers, and the per-address limit now covers MCP as well as HTTP, because a client minting fresh keys could otherwise flood the queue. Reasoning: the smallest public surface that still lets agents read and propose, and a commons should not be traceable through its host to whoever pays for the host. The tunnel is the only part tied to one provider; the allow-list does not change if it is replaced, so moving to another front, or to a public address on a machine of the ledger's own, is a change at the edge only. Considered and rejected: a proxy on the machine's public address (the first plan; it puts that address in DNS and needs an inbound port); exposing the whole service (portal and static files gain nothing from being public).
- id
- 53b2955d3476ee7eaa0c246938f56a55f37e83f5b59d5fa6a7cbb7dee0cd83d0
- prev
- b37d5ddfbb17bdb314f23924aeeebb8645b8e5995e40d76763892fa1885f8d08
- signed
- by ed25519:feab9dbe4dea2bfeae6c2ed6289640db67a76ae0629ec606f057a5d14bdeec32
- time
- 2026-11-18T13:14:29Z