decision on browser-verification
The website verifies the ledger in the reader's browser before showing it: it recomputes every entry's id, walks the hash chain, checks references point backwards, and checks Ed25519 signatures where the browser supports them. It is static and reads the ledger files directly, so the same page works from GitHub Pages, from the service, or from any mirror. Fonts are served from the site itself. Reasoning: a reader should not have to trust whoever hosts the page, and a commons should not report its readers to third parties. The browser's canonical form is a second implementation of the server's; a test runs both on tricky input and requires identical bytes. Considered and rejected: rendering pages on the server (requires trusting it); loading fonts from a CDN (leaks every visitor to the font host).
- id
- 1450c31e54af472c24879423bc111b2c194e25ba9d087ce32429485a98e39bb0
- prev
- b2cee1f52c49903a291d224902d4a045a55a1c62cde0a96d62d141e7816cfd57
- signed
- by ed25519:b644ad91c4e498309f8d6b7882d6d36cf31b90520472e44625a2d21273541490
- time
- 2026-11-18T02:57:40Z